In our post of July 27, 2010, we blogged about the case of Pepe v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., [2010] O.J. No. 2138 (S.C.J.) and whether a passenger in an insured’s motor vehicle was an “independent witness” who can corroborate the insured’s evidence concerning the involvement of an unidentified motorist for the purposes of the OPCF 44R Family Protection Endorsement. The motions judge held that the passenger could corroborate the insured’s claim for the purpose of OPCF 44R coverage, despite the fact that she was the insured's girlfriend and was also suing State Farm for damages caused by an unidentified driver.
The Court of Appeal has upheld the motions judge's decision.
Doherty J.A. reviewed the history of requiring corroboration and cited Chief Justice Dickson, in Vetrovec v. The Queen, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 811 at 826, for identifying the rationale for a corroboration requirement:
"The reason for requiring corroboration is that we believe the witness has good reason to lie. We therefore want some other piece of evidence which tends to convince us that he is telling the truth."
Doherty J.A. held that State Farm’s assertion that it is the witness who must be independent, in the sense of neutral to the outcome, was wrong. The independence requirement in the context of corroboration has always referred to the independence of the evidence and not to the neutrality of the witness. The witness’s neutrality or lack thereof is relevant to the ultimate credibility of the witness’s evidence, which is for the trial judge to assess.
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